In-Depth Analysis· Black Sea Grain Initiative Türkiye mediation role

Türkiye's Mediation Record: Black Sea Grain Initiative, Istanbul Talks and Humanitarian Diplomacy

How Türkiye's mediation shaped the Black Sea Grain Initiative, Istanbul talks, prisoner swaps and Gaza diplomacy, with UN, Russian, Ukrainian and Western views.

HON

By Horizon of Nations Editorial Team

Published: October 26, 2026

⏱ 8 min read (1,776 words)

Executive Summary & Key Facts

The Black Sea Grain Initiative was signed in Istanbul on 22 July 2022 by Türkiye, Ukraine, Russia and the United Nations, and it moved roughly 33 million tonnes of grain and other foodstuffs from three Ukrainian ports until Russia ended its participation on 17 July 2023.
The Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul, staffed by officials from all four parties, inspected and cleared vessels; it is the clearest example of Ankara acting as host, guarantor and logistics partner at once.
Türkiye has hosted Russia–Ukraine contacts at three levels: foreign ministers in Antalya (March 2022), delegations in Istanbul (March 2022 and again in 2025), and technical teams for grain and prisoner exchanges.
Russia, Ukraine, the UN and Western governments agree the grain corridor worked, but they disagree sharply on why it ended: Moscow cites unmet commitments on its own exports, while Kyiv and its partners say Russia chose to walk away.
Ankara's mediation rests on Montreux Convention Article 19, Ukraine's territorial integrity, and a refusal to join Western sanctions, and it extends to Gaza, Somalia–Ethiopia and Gulf diplomacy.

Why It Matters

Türkiye's mediation record is the most concrete example of a NATO member acting as a channel between Moscow and Kyiv. The Black Sea Grain Initiative, brokered in Istanbul in July 2022, reopened Ukrainian ports for roughly a year and moved about 33 million tonnes of grain and other food products to world markets. The same diplomatic toolkit (neutral venues, direct leader-level contact and humanitarian framing) now shapes Ankara's work on Gaza, the Horn of Africa and the Gulf.

Background

Ankara's role grew out of geography and treaty law. Türkiye controls the Bosporus and Dardanelles under the 1936 Montreux Convention, and it borders the Black Sea, where Russia and Ukraine are two of the world's largest grain exporters. Russia's full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022 blocked Ukraine's ports and raised food-price and food-security concerns, especially in import-dependent countries in Africa and the Middle East.

Timeline of key events

Date	Event
2022-02-28	Türkiye announces it will apply Article 19 of Montreux, restricting passage of belligerents' warships through the Straits.
2022-03-10	Foreign ministers Sergey Lavrov and Dmytro Kuleba meet in Antalya with Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, around the Antalya Diplomacy Forum (ADF). No breakthrough, but it is the first top-level meeting since the invasion.
2022-03-29	Russian and Ukrainian delegations meet at Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul; President Erdoğan addresses them.
2022-07-22	The Black Sea Grain Initiative is signed in Istanbul, together with a separate UN–Russia memorandum on Russian food and fertilizer exports.
2022-08-01	The first ship, the Razoni, leaves Odesa under the scheme.
2022-10-29 to 2022-11-02	Russia suspends participation after an attack on its Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol, then rejoins.
2023-03 and 2023-05	The deal is extended for shorter periods (60 days each), amid disputes over Russia's export demands.
2023-07-17	Russia declines to extend; the initiative ends.
2025-05-16	Direct Russia–Ukraine talks resume in Istanbul; a large prisoner exchange is agreed. Further rounds follow in June and July 2025.

How the initiative worked

The agreement was signed as parallel documents: Ukraine and Russia each concluded arrangements with Türkiye and the UN rather than signing one text together. Commercial ships left Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi along a designated corridor, were inspected in Turkish waters, and were cleared by the Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) in Istanbul. The JCC included representatives of Türkiye, Ukraine, Russia and the UN. According to UN figures, the corridor carried about 33 million tonnes over roughly a year, with corn and wheat making up most of the cargo.

Prisoner exchanges and humanitarian channels

Türkiye also facilitated humanitarian exchanges. In September 2022 an exchange involving commanders from the Azov regiment was reached with Turkish and Saudi involvement, with the commanders held in Türkiye under an arrangement Moscow later contested when they returned to Ukraine in July 2023. The 2025 Istanbul rounds produced agreements on large prisoner exchanges and on the return of wounded prisoners, young detainees and bodies of the fallen. A comprehensive ceasefire did not result.

Key Players & Positions

Actor	Position, as stated by its own sources
United Nations	Secretary-General António Guterres called the initiative a "beacon of hope" for global food security and repeatedly urged its renewal; the UN also pursued the parallel memorandum on Russian food and fertilizer. The UN regretted Russia's July 2023 decision.
Russia	The Russian Foreign Ministry argued that the part of the package concerning its own agricultural and fertilizer exports (banking access, shipping and insurance, and the ammonia pipeline) was not implemented, and that grain went mainly to wealthy states rather than the poorest. It said it would return if its conditions were met.
Ukraine	President Volodymyr Zelensky's government valued the corridor as a lifeline for exports and for global food prices. After Russia's exit, Kyiv set up its own corridor along the western Black Sea coast, and has said Russia used food as a weapon. Kyiv insists on its territorial integrity, including Crimea.
United States and EU	Western governments welcomed the deal and credited Ankara and the UN, while maintaining sanctions on Russia and blaming Moscow for its collapse. Some Western officials have also criticized Türkiye for not joining sanctions.
Israel (on Gaza)	The Israeli government says its Gaza operations are self-defence following the attacks of 7 October 2023. It has criticized Türkiye for hosting Hamas figures and for its trade measures.
Palestinian Authority and Arab mediators	Egypt and Qatar have led ceasefire mediation, with Türkiye participating. The Palestinian leadership seeks statehood on the 1967 lines.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources · Treaty Record

Türkiye's Position

Ankara describes its approach as principled, balanced diplomacy: it maintains channels with both Moscow and Kyiv while defending international law. The following points reflect official Turkish statements.

Dialogue is the only durable path. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry (MFA) and statements by the Presidency, Türkiye's priority is a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement, hosting talks in Antalya and Istanbul because it can speak to both sides. Ankara points to the grain corridor as proof that narrow, practical agreements can work during war.
Ukraine's territorial integrity is not negotiable. The MFA has repeatedly stated that Türkiye does not recognize the annexation of Crimea and supports Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, a position it also supports through its participation in the Crimean Platform.
Montreux is applied neutrally. Türkiye invoked Article 19 of the 1936 Montreux Convention in February 2022 and has applied the closure to belligerent warships of all parties. Ankara argues that this prevented a naval escalation in the Black Sea and that Montreux is a stabilizing legal mechanism. A joint Black Sea mine-countermeasures arrangement with Romania and Bulgaria, launched in January 2024, reinforces this approach.
Humanitarian diplomacy on Gaza and Palestine. According to the Presidency and the MFA, Türkiye calls for an immediate and lasting ceasefire, unhindered humanitarian access and a two-state solution on 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. Ankara recognized Palestine in 1988, supports UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19 (2012), restricted trade with Israel in 2024, and has announced it will join the ICJ proceedings brought by South Africa. It has also offered to act as a guarantor in any post-war arrangement, and it took part in the October 2025 Sharm el-Sheikh meeting on the Gaza ceasefire. Türkiye does not designate Hamas as a terrorist organization, a view that differs from that of the US, the EU and Israel.
Reform of global governance. Ankara argues that the stalemate over Ukraine and Gaza reflects the limits of the Security Council's structure, a case it summarizes as "the world is bigger than five" (see Türkiye's case for UN Security Council reform).

Africa and the Gulf

In Africa, Türkiye has expanded its embassy network to more than 40 missions and hosts the Türkiye–Africa Partnership Summit process. It mediated between Somalia and Ethiopia in the 2024 Ankara Declaration (11 December 2024), which committed both sides to resolve their dispute over access to the sea through negotiation. In the Gulf, Türkiye's backing of Qatar during the 2017 crisis was followed by a regional thaw after the January 2021 Al-Ula declaration and improved ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, partnerships that now help with prisoner exchanges and Gaza diplomacy. The Foreign Ministry also notes Türkiye's role as a large host of refugees, with more than 3 million Syrians sheltered at the peak.

Source Comparison

Issue	Western and international framing	Turkish and primary-source framing
Role of Türkiye	A useful intermediary that is also criticized for trade with Russia and for not imposing sanctions.	A treaty-based, neutral host that talks to all parties; the MFA cites the grain corridor and prisoner swaps as results.
End of the grain deal	Russia is blamed for withdrawing and for attacks on Ukrainian port infrastructure afterward.	Ankara regrets the end, urges Russia to return, and emphasizes the unmet Russian-export package alongside Ukraine's exports; it proposed a revival.
Istanbul talks 2022 and 2025	Limited results, with positions far apart; prisoner exchanges are the main concrete outcome.	A starting point that kept channels open; Ankara says it will keep hosting leader-level talks.
Gaza	Türkiye is seen as an advocate for Palestinians whose Hamas contacts complicate its mediation.	Türkiye describes humanitarian aid, ceasefire diplomacy and legal action as parts of one policy toward a two-state outcome.

Readers should check UN reports and the MFA, Presidency and Directorate of Communications statements directly; our Editorial Principles explain how we separate reported fact from stated position, and the Fact Check hub addresses recurring claims about Ankara's foreign policy.

Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI): The July 2022 package under which Ukrainian ports resumed exports under UN and Turkish oversight.
Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): The Istanbul body that approved vessels, inspected cargoes and coordinated sailing schedules.
Montreux Convention (1936): The treaty regulating passage through the Turkish Straits; see the Montreux guide.
Antalya Diplomacy Forum (ADF): Türkiye's annual diplomatic gathering, launched in 2021, which hosted the March 2022 Lavrov–Kuleba meeting.
Ankara Declaration: The December 2024 Somalia–Ethiopia understanding mediated by Türkiye.

For more context, see About Horizon of Nations and the guide to Counter-Terrorism at Source and Türkiye's defense industry.

Horizon of Nations presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked "Türkiye's Position" reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. All claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents and official statements, so that readers can verify them independently.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

The Nations Dialogue: Türkiye as Mediator: The Black Sea Grain Initiative, Istanbul Talks and Gaza Humanitarian Diplomacy — Explainer on Türkiye's mediation record: Istanbul talks, the Black Sea Grain Initiative, prisoner swaps and Gaza humanitarian diplomacy, with all sides' views.
Index of Nations: Türkiye as Mediator: Russia–Ukraine Talks, the Black Sea Grain Initiative and Gaza Humanitarian Diplomacy — Türkiye mediation: Russia–Ukraine talks, the Black Sea Grain Initiative and Gaza diplomacy, with timelines, actor positions and how indices score it.
Borders & Blocs: Türkiye's Mediation in the Russia–Ukraine War and the Black Sea Grain Initiative — Türkiye mediation in the Russia–Ukraine war explained: Antalya and Istanbul talks, Black Sea Grain Initiative, prisoner swaps, why it ended and its limits.

Frequently asked questions

What was the Black Sea Grain Initiative?

It was a July 2022 arrangement signed in Istanbul by Türkiye, Ukraine, Russia and the UN that allowed commercial ships to export grain and other food from Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi. Ships were inspected and cleared by the Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul. According to UN figures, it moved roughly 33 million tonnes before it ended on 17 July 2023.

Why did the Black Sea Grain Initiative end?

Russia declined to extend it on 17 July 2023, saying that commitments on its own agricultural and fertilizer exports had not been met. Ukraine, the UN and Western governments said the corridor was working and criticized Russia for leaving. Türkiye expressed regret and has proposed reviving the arrangement.

What role did Türkiye play in the grain deal?

Türkiye hosted the negotiations, co-signed the arrangement, housed the Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul and carried out inspections of vessels in its waters. President Erdoğan and the Turkish Defence and Foreign ministries worked with UN Secretary-General António Guterres to reach and extend it.

Has Türkiye hosted Russia–Ukraine peace talks beyond the grain deal?

Yes. Foreign ministers met in Antalya on 10 March 2022, delegations met in Istanbul on 29 March 2022, and direct talks resumed in Istanbul in May, June and July 2025. These produced prisoner and body exchanges but no comprehensive ceasefire.

What is Türkiye's position on Gaza?

According to the Presidency and the Foreign Ministry, Türkiye calls for an immediate ceasefire, unobstructed humanitarian aid and a two-state solution based on 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as Palestine's capital. It has restricted trade with Israel, announced it will join the ICJ case, and taken part in ceasefire diplomacy. Israel, the US and the EU differ with Ankara on Hamas, which Türkiye does not list as a terrorist group.

Does Türkiye's mediation extend beyond Ukraine and Gaza?

Yes. In December 2024 Türkiye hosted the Ankara Declaration between Somalia and Ethiopia, and it has widened its presence in Africa through embassies and summits. In the Gulf, ties with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have supported humanitarian and mediation efforts.

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