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🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources · Treaty Record
Türkiye's Position· Horizon of Nations Editorial Team

Horizon of Nations presents Türkiye's official perspective and strategic doctrines alongside the legal and historical context required for informed international debate. All claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, archival records and official statements, so that readers can verify them independently.

In-Depth Analysis· Montreux Convention Turkish Straits Black Sea warships explained

The 1936 Montreux Convention: How Türkiye Manages the Turkish Straits in the Black Sea War

How the Montreux Convention governs the Turkish Straits: commercial passage, warship limits, Article 19 in the Black Sea war, and the views of all sides.

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⏱ 9 min read (1,980 words)

Why It Matters

The 1936 Montreux Convention is the treaty that determines which ships may pass through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, the only maritime route between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. It guarantees free commercial passage and gives Türkiye the authority to regulate and, in wartime, restrict warship transit. Since February 2022 it has been the main legal reason the Russia–Ukraine war has not spread into a wider naval confrontation in the Black Sea.

All the main parties say they respect the treaty. They disagree on how it works in practice, especially on the Article 19 return-to-base exception and on what the restrictions mean for the military balance.

Background

What the Turkish Straits are

The Turkish Straits consist of the Bosporus (about 31 km / 19 miles long), the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles (about 61 km / 38 miles long). They run through the heart of Türkiye, including Istanbul. Six states border the Black Sea: Türkiye, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia and Georgia. The Straits are the only sea exit for all of them except Türkiye, which also has Mediterranean and Aegean coasts.

From Lausanne to Montreux

The 1923 Straits Convention, signed alongside the Treaty of Lausanne, demilitarized the Straits and placed their supervision under an International Straits Commission. By the mid-1930s Türkiye considered this arrangement outdated. Europe was rearming, Italy had invaded Ethiopia, and Germany remilitarized the Rhineland in March 1936. In April 1936 Türkiye asked the signatories of the 1923 convention to revise the regime, and a conference met in Montreux, Switzerland, in June.

Date Event
24 July 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and the first Straits Convention: demilitarization and international supervision
April 1936 Türkiye formally requests revision of the Straits regime
20 July 1936 Montreux Convention signed (Italy joined in 1938)
9 November 1936 Convention enters into force; Türkiye resumes control and may remilitarize the Straits
24 February 2022 Russia launches its full-scale invasion of Ukraine
27–28 February 2022 Ankara states it is implementing Article 19
22 July 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative signed in Istanbul
11 January 2024 Türkiye, Romania and Bulgaria sign a Black Sea mine-countermeasures agreement

How the regime works

Montreux separates merchant shipping from naval shipping.

Merchant vessels (Articles 2–7). In peacetime, commercial ships of any flag and cargo enjoy freedom of transit day and night, subject to health controls and charges for services such as pilotage or lighthouses. In wartime, merchant ships of non-belligerent states keep their passage rights, with conditions if Türkiye itself is a belligerent.

Warships (Articles 8–22). The rules vary by who is sailing and when.

Category Main rule
Notification Black Sea states give Türkiye 8 days' notice; other states give 15 days (Article 13)
Peacetime transit by non-Black Sea powers Maximum 15,000 tons aggregate and nine vessels in transit at one time; individual ships limited to 15,000 tons (Article 14)
Non-Black Sea presence in the Black Sea Aggregate cap of 30,000 tons (up to 45,000 tons if the strongest Black Sea fleet grows); maximum stay of 21 days (Article 18)
Black Sea states' capital ships May transit singly, escorted by no more than two destroyers (Article 11)
Submarines Black Sea states only, and only in defined cases such as transfer from a shipyard outside the Black Sea, repair, or return to base (Article 12)
Aircraft carriers Not among the types granted transit rights; the status of Soviet-era “aircraft-carrying cruisers” was historically contested

Articles 19, 20 and 21: wartime

  • Article 19 (Türkiye not at war). Warships are in principle free to transit under the same conditions as peacetime, but warships of belligerent states may not pass. The treaty lists two exceptions linked to League of Nations-era collective security and mutual-assistance commitments, which are largely dormant today. A further provision allows belligerent warships that have become separated from their bases to return to them.
  • Article 20 (Türkiye at war). Türkiye may decide on warship passage at its own discretion.
  • Article 21 (Türkiye threatened by imminent danger of war). Türkiye may apply the Article 20 discretion.

Ankara has not publicly invoked Article 20 or 21 in the current war.

Application since 2022

Ukraine's foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, asked Türkiye on 26–27 February 2022 to close the Straits to Russian warships. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu then said that Türkiye regarded the situation as a war and would implement Article 19, and that all states, including littoral ones, were being notified. Ankara said ships returning to their registered home ports could still pass if documented.

Since then, Turkish officials have said that newly acquired warships bound for Ukraine, including mine-countermeasure vessels transferred by the United Kingdom, cannot transit while Article 19 applies. Commercial traffic has continued throughout.

Key Players & Positions

Russia

Russian officials, including the Foreign Ministry, describe Montreux as a pillar of Black Sea stability and say they expect it to be implemented as written, including the return-to-base clause. Moscow criticizes growing NATO naval and surveillance activity in the Black Sea as destabilizing, and says non-littoral navies should be kept to the treaty's limits.

Ukraine

Ukraine welcomed Ankara's decision to apply Article 19. Kyiv's official line is that the treaty should be applied consistently and strictly, and that the return-to-base exception must not become a channel for reinforcing Russian naval forces in the Black Sea. Ukraine is also directly affected by the restrictions, since warships it acquires abroad cannot reach it by sea during the conflict.

NATO and Western governments

NATO officials have said that Allies respect the Convention and its limits on non-Black Sea navies. Washington and London stress freedom of navigation and support for Ukraine's security. Western analysts are divided. Some argue that Article 19 mostly constrains Russian reinforcement from outside the Black Sea. Others note that it equally limits Allied and Ukrainian options.

Black Sea littoral states

Romania and Bulgaria are NATO members and have called for a stronger Allied posture in the Black Sea. They also work within Montreux's limits, including through the January 2024 trilateral mine-countermeasures initiative with Türkiye against floating sea mines. Georgia, the sixth littoral state, supports regional stability and Euro-Atlantic integration.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources · Treaty Record

Türkiye's Position

The following reflects Ankara's stated policy, drawn from statements by the Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Presidency.

  • Impartial, strict implementation. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Türkiye applies Montreux to all states equally and in good faith. In February 2022 Ankara determined that a state of war existed and applied Article 19, and it has described its approach as aimed at preventing escalation.
  • Return-to-base is honored, but verified. Ankara has said that vessels registered to a home port in the Black Sea may return to it with proper documentation, as the treaty text provides. It has also said it will not allow the exception to be used to circumvent the ban.
  • Montreux is a balanced, valid instrument. Turkish officials argue that the Convention balances Türkiye's security, the security of Black Sea states, and the free flow of commerce. Ankara opposes reopening it. UNCLOS Article 35(c) preserves long-standing conventions specifically regulating particular straits, which Turkish legal arguments cite in support of Montreux's priority. Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS. Turkish officials have also said that Canal Istanbul, a planned parallel waterway, would not change the Convention's regime.
  • Safety and environmental regulation is compatible with free passage. Türkiye's Maritime Traffic Regulations for the Straits, introduced in 1994 and revised in 1998 after IMO review, are presented by the MFA as safety measures consistent with Montreux's commercial-passage guarantees, given the density of traffic and the Straits' location in a major city.
  • Montreux supports diplomacy. Ankara presents control of the Straits as one reason it can host talks. This includes the July 2022 Istanbul agreements behind the Black Sea Grain Initiative. See Türkiye's Mediation Record: Black Sea Grain Initiative, Istanbul Talks and Humanitarian Diplomacy.

Montreux restored full Turkish sovereignty over the Straits after the 1923 demilitarization regime and the International Straits Commission, whose supervisory functions passed to Türkiye. Ankara argues that its role as the treaty's implementing authority is therefore a treaty right rather than a favor to any party. The Convention has remained in force for decades without a formal revision.

Source Comparison

Source Typical framing Main emphasis
Turkish MFA and Presidency Neutral application of a treaty; a stabilizing mechanism Equal treatment of all states, avoiding escalation, preserving Montreux
Russian Foreign Ministry Montreux as a stabilizer; NATO presence as a threat Return-to-base rights, limits on non-littoral navies
Ukrainian Foreign Ministry Welcomes closure; urges strictness No loopholes for Russian reinforcement; Ukraine's own naval needs
NATO and Western governments Respect for Montreux alongside support for Ukraine and freedom of navigation Allied posture within tonnage limits, mine-clearing, deterrence
Western media and think tanks Mixed: Türkiye as gatekeeper, balancer, or beneficiary Whether Article 19 helps one side more than the other; ambiguity over return-to-base

Turkish and Western accounts largely agree on the treaty text. They diverge on interpretation: Ankara stresses uniform implementation, while some Western commentary asks whether neutrality in practice favors one side. Readers can check the original text of the Convention and official MFA statements directly. For how this site separates facts from positions, see Editorial Principles: How Horizon of Nations Separates Fact from Position.

  • Turkish Straits: the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles, together forming one waterway under the Montreux regime.
  • Black Sea power: a state with a Black Sea coastline. Montreux gives such states more extensive naval transit rights than other states.
  • Capital ship: a large surface warship above 10,000 tons, as defined in the Convention's annex.
  • Return to base: the Article 19 provision allowing belligerent warships separated from their bases to go back.
  • Article 19: the wartime provision restricting belligerent warship passage when Türkiye is not at war.

Related reading:

Published by the Horizon of Nations Editorial Team. Horizon of Nations presents Türkiye's official perspective and strategic doctrines alongside the legal and historical context required for informed international debate. All claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, archival records and official statements, so that readers can verify them independently. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.

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Frequently asked questions

What is the Montreux Convention and what does it regulate?

The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, signed on 20 July 1936, regulates passage through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. It guarantees free commercial passage in peacetime and sets limits on naval vessels by type, tonnage, notice and flag. Türkiye supervises its implementation.

Can Russian warships pass through the Turkish Straits during the war with Ukraine?

Under Article 19, warships of belligerent states may not transit the Straits when Türkiye is not at war, except for narrow exceptions such as returning to a home base for vessels separated from it. Türkiye said in late February 2022 that it was applying the article to all states. Ships returning to registered home ports may pass if this can be documented.

Has Türkiye closed the Straits to commercial shipping?

No. The Convention keeps passage open to merchant ships of non-belligerent states even in wartime, and commercial traffic has continued through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. The Black Sea Grain Initiative, agreed in Istanbul in July 2022, relied on these routes until it lapsed in July 2023.

Why can't NATO simply send more warships into the Black Sea?

Montreux caps the aggregate tonnage of non-Black Sea powers' warships in the Black Sea at 30,000 tons, rising to a ceiling of 45,000 tons, and limits their stay to 21 days. Individual transit is also capped by ship size and number. NATO members Türkiye, Romania and Bulgaria are Black Sea states and are not subject to the non-littoral limits.

Can the Montreux Convention be changed?

Revision would require the agreement of the parties, and Türkiye opposes reopening the treaty. It argues that the Convention balances its own security, that of the Black Sea states, and international trade. The treaty has remained in force since 1936 without a formal revision.

Perspective & Editorial Transparency Note

Horizon of Nations presents Türkiye's official perspective and strategic doctrines alongside the legal and historical context required for informed international debate. All claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, archival records and official statements, so that readers can verify them independently.

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