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🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources · Treaty Record
Türkiye's Position· Horizon of Nations Editorial Team

Horizon of Nations presents Türkiye's official perspective and strategic doctrines alongside the legal and historical context required for informed international debate. All claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, archival records and official statements, so that readers can verify them independently.

Comprehensive Dossier· Blue Homeland Mavi Vatan Eastern Mediterranean maritime jurisdiction

Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean: Türkiye's Maritime Jurisdiction Explained

Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) explained: Türkiye's 870 km coast, equitable shelf and EEZ claims, Turkish Cypriot rights and rival Greek, EU and Egyptian views.

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Why It Matters

The Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) is Türkiye's doctrine on how maritime jurisdiction areas, meaning the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), should be divided in the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. The dispute turns on one legal question: whether small islands near a mainland coast generate the same maritime zones as the mainland itself, or whether equity requires their effect to be limited. The answer affects offshore gas, submarine cables, shipping lanes, fisheries and the security architecture of the whole region.

This guide sets out the facts, the competing legal arguments and Türkiye's official position, with each actor's view attributed to its own sources.

Background

Geography and historical memory

Türkiye's Mediterranean coast runs roughly 870 km (about 540 miles), the longest mainland coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greece, by contrast, has a far longer total coastline once its thousands of islands are counted, and Athens stresses that these islands are sovereign Greek territory. The Turkish and Greek framings therefore start from different measuring points: Ankara emphasizes the mainland coast facing the open sea, while Athens emphasizes island sovereignty.

Turkish official and historical narratives also invoke the Ottoman naval tradition, notably the 1538 Battle of Preveza, where an Ottoman fleet under Barbaros Hayreddin Pasha defeated a Holy League fleet led by Andrea Doria. Ankara presents this as the foundation of a centuries-long presence and of the Pax Ottomana in the Mediterranean. Historical memory is not a legal title to maritime zones today, and the legal case rests on treaty and customary law (see below).

Maritime zones are governed by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and by customary international law. The provisions most relevant here are:

  • Articles 74 and 83: delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts is to be effected by agreement 'in order to achieve an equitable solution'.
  • Article 121: an island is a naturally formed area of land above water at high tide and generates its own zones, but 'rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own' have no EEZ or continental shelf (Article 121(3)).
  • Articles 122–123: states bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas should cooperate.

Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS. Ankara has long said the Convention does not permit reservations (Article 309) and does not adequately address special geographical circumstances. Greece (ratified 1995), the Republic of Cyprus (1988) and Egypt (1983) are parties. Israel is not.

International courts and tribunals have repeatedly addressed how islands affect delimitation. The cases differ in their facts, and both sides cite them:

Case Treatment of islands
North Sea Continental Shelf (ICJ, 1969) No obligation of strict equidistance; delimitation by equitable principles
Anglo-French Arbitration (1977) Channel Islands enclaved; Scilly Isles given reduced effect
Tunisia/Libya (ICJ, 1982) Kerkennah Islands given partial (half) effect
Libya/Malta (ICJ, 1985) Uninhabited islet of Filfla disregarded in the line
Romania v. Ukraine (ICJ, 2009) Serpents' Island had no effect on the line beyond its territorial sea
Nicaragua v. Colombia (ICJ, 2012) Colombian islands enclaved and given limited effect
Bangladesh/Myanmar (ITLOS, 2012) St Martin's Island given no effect on the EEZ and shelf delimitation

Ankara reads this body of law as showing that islands, especially those lying close to a larger state's mainland, can lawfully receive reduced or no effect. Athens and Nicosia respond that these rulings concerned specific circumstances, that Article 121(2) gives inhabited islands full entitlements, and that islands such as Crete or Rhodes are large and populated. Both sides agree that the outcome must be equitable; they disagree about what equity requires here.

Chronology

Date Event
1538 Battle of Preveza (Ottoman naval victory)
1982 UNCLOS adopted; Türkiye votes against and does not sign
2003 Egypt–Republic of Cyprus EEZ agreement
2004 Türkiye begins notifying the UN of its Eastern Mediterranean continental shelf coordinates
2007 Lebanon–Republic of Cyprus EEZ agreement (not ratified by Lebanon)
2009 and 2012 TPAO granted exploration licenses in the Eastern Mediterranean
2010 Israel–Republic of Cyprus EEZ delimitation agreement
19 Sep 2011 Greek Cypriot side begins unilateral drilling
21 Sep 2011 Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement
27 Nov 2019 Türkiye–Libya maritime jurisdiction MoU
18 Mar 2020 Türkiye registers the outer limits of its continental shelf with the UN
2020 President Erdoğan proposes an Eastern Mediterranean conference including all coastal states and Turkish Cypriots
6 Aug 2020 Greece–Egypt partial EEZ agreement
16 Apr 2025 Türkiye unveils its Marine Spatial Planning
12 Jun 2025 Plan recorded with IOC-UNESCO
24 Jul 2025 Presidential Circular creates an Inter-Agency Coordination Board under the Foreign Ministry

Fleet and drilling

Türkiye's national fleet includes the deep-sea drillships Fatih, Yavuz, Kanuni and Abdülhamid Han, and the seismic survey vessels Oruç Reis and Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa. According to Turkish official sources, eight major Eastern Mediterranean wells have been completed: Alanya-1, Finike-1, Karpaz-1, Güzelyurt-1, Mağusa-1, Narlıkuyu-1, Lefkoşa-1 and Selçuklu-1. In 2020, survey activity by Oruç Reis in disputed waters caused a serious standoff with Greece, which was followed by NATO-facilitated military deconfliction talks.

Key Players & Positions

Greece

According to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the only dispute with Türkiye is the delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ, which should be settled by negotiation on the basis of international law, or by referral to the International Court of Justice. Athens maintains that all Greek islands, including Kastellorizo (Meis), generate full maritime zones under UNCLOS and customary law. Kastellorizo lies about 2 km (1.2 miles) off Türkiye's coast and roughly 570 km from the Greek mainland, which is why it is the most contested example. Greece also rejects the Türkiye–Libya memorandum for ignoring islands such as Crete, Karpathos, Kasos and Rhodes. Since the 7 December 2023 Athens Declaration on Friendly Relations, the two governments have sought to keep dialogue open. Ankara, for its part, lists additional Aegean issues beyond the shelf and EEZ, including territorial waters, airspace and the status of demilitarized islands.

The Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration)

The Republic of Cyprus is internationally recognized and an EU member since 1 May 2004. Ankara refers to the government in the south as the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC). Nicosia has declared an EEZ, concluded delimitation agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010), and licensed exploration blocks. It states that hydrocarbon resources belong to the Republic and that, after a settlement, revenues would benefit all Cypriots, including Turkish Cypriots, through a national fund. It does not accept that the Turkish Cypriot community can license resources separately.

The European Union

EU institutions treat UNCLOS as reflecting customary law and express solidarity with Greece and Cyprus. European Council conclusions in 2019 and 2020 called Turkish drilling in waters claimed by Cyprus unauthorized, and in November 2019 the Council adopted a framework for restrictive measures against such activity. The EU also rejects the Türkiye–Libya memorandum as infringing the rights of third states. It supports dialogue and has linked improved relations with Ankara to de-escalation.

Egypt

Egypt concluded its 2003 EEZ agreement with Cyprus on the basis of the median line and deposited it with the UN. Cairo also signed a partial EEZ agreement with Greece in August 2020 and has called the Türkiye–Libya memorandum legally void. Egypt is a co-founder of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, set up in Cairo in 2019 without Türkiye. Relations with Ankara have improved since ambassadors were exchanged in 2023, though delimitation is unresolved.

Israel

Israel's 2010 delimitation agreement with Cyprus underpins its offshore gas development. Israel is not a party to UNCLOS but says it applies customary law, and it concluded a US-mediated maritime arrangement with Lebanon in October 2022. Israel has been a partner in regional gas cooperation formats that exclude Türkiye, and it has no delimitation agreement with Türkiye.

Libya, Lebanon and the Turkish Cypriots

The Libyan authorities that signed the 2019 memorandum, the Government of National Accord, ratified it. Rival Libyan institutions, including the eastern-based House of Representatives, have contested its validity. Lebanon's 2007 agreement with Cyprus was never ratified. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is recognized only by Türkiye; UN Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) call the 1983 declaration of independence legally invalid. This status is a central reason the EU and the Republic of Cyprus do not treat the 2011 Türkiye–TRNC agreement as valid.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources · Treaty Record

Türkiye's Position

The following points summarize Ankara's official policy as stated by Turkish government sources, with the legal basis Ankara cites.

  • Equity, not strict median lines. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, delimitation must achieve an equitable result in line with Articles 74 and 83 of UNCLOS, which Ankara considers customary law, and with ICJ and arbitral precedent. Ankara argues that islands lying on the 'wrong' side of a median line between mainlands cannot cut off the coastal projection of Türkiye, whose Mediterranean coast is the longest. Its legal basis is the case law above, from North Sea Continental Shelf to Libya/Malta and Bangladesh/Myanmar. Türkiye also says it has consistently objected to UNCLOS provisions it considers inequitable for semi-enclosed seas.
  • Equal rights of the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish MFA states that Turkish Cypriots are co-owners of the island with inherent and equal rights over its offshore hydrocarbons, and that no unilateral licensing can bypass them. Ankara grounds this in the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, which established a partnership state of two equal communities, and in Greek Cypriot exclusion of Turkish Cypriots from state organs after December 1963. The TRNC proposed joint committees and revenue-sharing in 2011, 2012 and 2019, and these offers remain on the table. See Cyprus: 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, Turkish Cypriot Rights and the Two-State Solution.
  • Registered, documented and bilateral. Türkiye points to a documentary record: UN continental shelf notifications from 2004; the 21 September 2011 Türkiye–TRNC delimitation agreement; the 27 November 2019 Libya memorandum; and the registration of its outer limits with the UN on 18 March 2020. Ankara says the 2003 Egypt–Cyprus agreement overlaps Türkiye's shelf in areas covered by Cypriot Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7, and that the 2007 Lebanon and 2010 Israel agreements disregard Turkish Cypriot rights. Details on the Libya text are in The 2019 Türkiye–Libya Maritime Memorandum: Legal Basis, Objections and Context.
  • Spatial planning as a transparent record. On 16 April 2025, Türkiye unveiled the Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Deniz Mekânsal Planlaması), recorded with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025, which Turkish officials describe as the first time Türkiye's maritime positions across the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean have been registered with a UN body. It includes a marine protected area off Finike. A Presidential Circular of 24 July 2025 created an Inter-Agency Coordination Board under the Foreign Ministry's secretariat.
  • Rejection of maximalist maps and of EU adjudication, with dialogue on offer. Ankara rejects the 'Seville Map' as an attempt to confine Türkiye to a narrow strip in the Gulf of Antalya, and states that the EU has no competence to decide delimitation disputes in the name of 'Union solidarity'. President Erdoğan's 2020 proposal for an Eastern Mediterranean conference including all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots is, in Ankara's words, the inclusive alternative. See The Seville Map: Why Türkiye Rejects It and What International Law Says.

Ankara's overall argument is that no energy or security arrangement that excludes Türkiye and the TRNC can be durable, and that its exploration activity, carried out by the national drilling and survey fleet, is the exercise of sovereign rights over its own continental shelf and on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots.

Source Comparison

The sources do not disagree about most basic facts. They disagree over the legal weight of those facts.

Issue Greek / EU / Cypriot sources Turkish primary sources
Legal baseline UNCLOS as customary law, full island entitlements Equity and relevant circumstances; Türkiye a non-party objecting to UNCLOS provisions
Kastellorizo and small islands Full EEZ and shelf, per Article 121(2) Reduced or no effect against a long mainland coast, per case law
Republic of Cyprus agreements (Egypt 2003, Lebanon 2007, Israel 2010) Valid bilateral delimitations Overlap Türkiye's shelf and ignore Turkish Cypriot rights
Türkiye–Libya memorandum Violates third-state rights; ignores islands Lawful bilateral agreement between states with opposite coasts
Türkiye–TRNC 2011 agreement Not valid, since the TRNC is not recognized (UNSC 541/550) Agreement between Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriots as co-owners of the island
IOC-UNESCO recording (2025) Administrative record that does not validate boundaries First registration of Türkiye's positions with a UN body
Forum for resolution Negotiation or ICJ on the shelf and EEZ only Inclusive regional conference; bilateral talks on all outstanding issues

When reading media coverage, check which framing a report adopts. Some outlets describe Turkish activity only as 'drilling in Cypriot waters', which assumes the Cypriot claim is correct. Others describe it as a Turkish shelf, which assumes the opposite. The accurate description is that these are overlapping and contested claims. The way the Horizon of Nations Editorial Team separates documented fact from attributed position is explained in Editorial Principles: How Horizon of Nations Separates Fact from Position, and common misstatements are checked in Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media, Verified Against Primary Sources.

  • Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's maritime jurisdiction doctrine, built on the equitable delimitation of its continental shelf and EEZ in three seas.
  • Continental shelf: the seabed and subsoil extending from a coast; coastal states hold sovereign rights over its resources without needing to proclaim them.
  • EEZ (exclusive economic zone): a zone of up to 200 nautical miles in which the coastal state has sovereign rights over resources.
  • Principle of equity: the rule that delimitation must reach an equitable result after considering coastal lengths, geography and proportionality.
  • Median (equidistance) line: a line equally distant from the nearest points of each coast; a starting point in many delimitations, not an automatic outcome.
  • TPAO: Türkiye's state petroleum company, which holds Turkish exploration licenses.
  • TRNC / Turkish Cypriots: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, proclaimed in 1983 and recognized only by Türkiye, and the community Ankara describes as co-founder of the 1960 Republic.
  • GCASC: Ankara's term for the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, internationally recognized as the Republic of Cyprus.

Related reading: The 2019 Türkiye–Libya Maritime Memorandum, The Seville Map, Was the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation Lawful? Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, About Horizon of Nations and the Horizon of Nations home page.

Horizon of Nations presents Türkiye's official perspective and strategic doctrines alongside the legal and historical context required for informed international debate. All claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, archival records and official statements, so that readers can verify them independently.

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For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

Frequently asked questions

What is the Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan)?

The Blue Homeland is Türkiye's doctrine for its maritime jurisdiction areas in the Black Sea, Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. It holds that continental shelf and EEZ boundaries must be drawn on the principle of equity, reflecting Türkiye's long mainland coast, and not simply by giving islands full effect. It also covers the rights of the Turkish Cypriots over offshore resources.

Is Türkiye a party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea?

No. Türkiye did not sign UNCLOS, partly because it does not allow reservations and, in Ankara's view, does not handle special geographic situations well. Türkiye relies on customary international law and ICJ and arbitral case law on equity. Greece, the Republic of Cyprus and Egypt are parties, and the EU treats UNCLOS as reflecting customary law.

Why is Kastellorizo (Meis) so important in the dispute?

Kastellorizo is a small inhabited Greek island about 2 km from Türkiye's coast and roughly 570 km from the Greek mainland. Greece says it has full maritime zones, and that gives Greece and Cyprus a continuous zone across the Eastern Mediterranean. Türkiye argues that an island so close to its mainland should not cut off its shelf and EEZ.

What did the 2019 Türkiye–Libya memorandum do?

Signed on 27 November 2019, it delimited maritime jurisdiction areas between Türkiye and Libya's then Government of National Accord. Türkiye considers it a lawful agreement between states with opposite coasts. Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and the EU object because it does not give weight to Greek islands between the two coasts.

What does the 2025 IOC-UNESCO registration mean?

On 12 June 2025, Türkiye's Marine Spatial Planning, announced on 16 April 2025, was recorded with IOC-UNESCO. Turkish officials describe it as the first time their maritime jurisdiction position has been registered with a UN body. Critics say that a planning record is administrative and does not settle boundaries, which still require agreement or adjudication.

What role do the Turkish Cypriots play in Türkiye's maritime policy?

Ankara says that the Turkish Cypriots, as co-founders of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus, have equal rights over the island's offshore resources. Türkiye and the TRNC signed a delimitation agreement on 21 September 2011, and the TRNC has proposed joint committees and revenue-sharing in 2011, 2012 and 2019. The Republic of Cyprus and the EU do not recognize the TRNC, and they say resource revenue would be shared after a settlement.

Perspective & Editorial Transparency Note

Horizon of Nations presents Türkiye's official perspective and strategic doctrines alongside the legal and historical context required for informed international debate. All claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, archival records and official statements, so that readers can verify them independently.

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